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Abstract 
 
This paper explores the extent to which changes to long-term interest rates in major advanced 
economies have influenced long-term government bond yields in Emerging Asia. To gauge 
long-term interest spillover effects, the paper uses VAR variance decompositions with high 
frequency data. Our results reveal that sovereign bond yields in Emerging Asia responded 
significantly to changes to US and Eurozone bond yields, although the magnitudes were 
heterogeneous across countries. The size of spillovers varied over time. The pattern of these 
variations can partially be explained by the implementation of different unconventional 
monetary policy measures in advanced countries. 
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1. Introduction 
For a number of years, the central banks of the major advanced economies have pursued 
historically unprecedented ultra-low interest rate policies and negative interest rate policies; 
facing the zero lower bound problem, they have also implemented various asset purchase 
programs – known as “quantitative easing” (QE) – with the aim of reducing long-term 
interest rates. While there is a continuing debate on the relation between short-term and long-
term interest rates (Roley and Sellon, 1995; Wright, 2012) as well as the effect of QE policies 
on long-term rates (Belke et al., 2016, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011; 
Christensen and Rudebusch, 2012; Christensen and Krogstrup, 2015; Gros et al., 2015), there 
has been growing evidence that advanced countries’ unconventional monetary policies 
(UMPs) have caused significant spillovers to the financial markets of emerging market 
economies (EMEs).4 
Importantly, the decline in short- and long-term government yields in advanced countries has 
contributed to the flow of investment funds into EME assets with higher risk-adjusted returns. 
Such additional flows of funds into emerging market bonds may influence domestic monetary 
conditions by altering long-term yields in emerging countries. Furthermore, some EMEs 
recently have experienced increases in foreign investment in conjunction with growth in both 
the liquidity and principal outstanding in their local currency government bond markets, 
potentially increasing the link between foreign and domestic interest rates via portfolio 
reallocations between developed and emerging bond markets (Moore et al., 2013). 
Against this backdrop, this paper investigates the evolution of spillovers from advanced 
countries’ bond markets to EMEs. The analysis and quantification of these spillovers 
provides insights into the degree of monetary independence that EMEs enjoy. To gauge long-
term interest spillover effects, the paper uses vector autoregressive (VAR) variance 
decompositions with daily data for eight Asian emerging economies (China, India, Indonesia, 
Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Thailand)5 as well as Hong Kong, the US, the 
Euro area and Japan for the period May 2003 to September 2016. 
In contrast to previous studies looking into monetary policy spillovers to EMEs, we use high-
frequency data, the dynamics of which are less affected by macroeconomic fundamentals. 
This is an advantage in identifying spillovers in financial markets, where news are priced 
rapidly. Given a much larger number of observations as compared to using data at lower 
frequency, we are also able to better analyze the time-variations in the spillovers and detect 
sudden changes in transmission magnitudes. 
Apart from event studies which are usually based on daily (or intra-daily) data, most 
empirical investigations of interest rate spillovers from the advanced countries to EMEs use 
monthly or quarterly data (Belke et al., 2016). To our knowledge, the only non-event study 
where high frequency data is used to investigate interest rate spillovers from the US to EMEs 
is Edwards(2012). However, there are a number of important differences between our 
                                                           
4
 See Chen et al. (2012), Lavigne et al. (2014), Miyajima et al. (2014), Bowman et al. (2015), Eichengreen and 
Gupta (2015), Hofmann and Takáts (2015), Tillmann (2016) and Caceres et al. (2016). 
5
 These eight Asian economies are included in the widely used Modern Index Strategy Indexes (MSCI) 
Emerging Markets Index. Hong Kong is considered a developed market by MSCI. 
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analysis and that conducted by Edwards (2012). Firstly, Edwards analyses spillovers from the 
US to seven EMEs, only three of which are Asian (Indonesia, Korea, and the Philippines), 
while we analyze spillovers to eight Asian EMEs plus Hong Kong. Secondly, while Edwards 
investigates only spillovers from the Fed’s monetary policies to EMEs, we are interested also 
in potential interest rate pass-through from the Euro area and Japan, respectively. Thirdly, 
Edwards covers only the relatively tranquil period of the “great moderation” using data from 
January 2000 until the second week of September 2008 while our analysis includes also the 
time when the Fed, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank of Japan (BOJ) 
embarked on UMPs on an unprecedented scale. Fourthly, Edwards looks into short-term 
interest rates while we investigate long-term rates. Fifthly, we use daily data, in contrast to 
the weekly data used by Edwards. And, finally, Edwards uses GLS and GMM estimations 
whereas we follow a completely different empirical approach based on Vector-
autoregressions (VARs). 
In this paper we construct measures of spillover intensities from major advanced countries to 
Emerging Asia and analyze their time-variations against the backdrop of monetary policy 
changes or announcements in advanced economies. This study is not an event study, since we 
do not model particular announcements, but rather scrutinize the dynamics of the co-
movements between long-term interest rates over a timeframe during which major central 
banks conducted a number of UMPs. Our results show that sovereign bond yields in 
Emerging Asia are significantly affected by changes in US and Eurozone bond yields, 
although the magnitude of spillovers varied substantially over time and across countries. 
Whereas the turning points in the intensity of spillovers from the US appear to be directly 
related to the Fed’s monetary policy, the results for the Euro area and Japan spillovers turn 
out to be heterogeneous across Emerging Asia. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief discussion of 
bond markets in Emerging Asia and a review of the literature on monetary policy spillovers 
between advanced and emerging economies. Section 3 outlines our estimation approach and 
the data and variables we use. Section 4 presents our estimations of bond yield spillovers, 
followed by robustness checks in Section 5. Section 6 sums up our findings and discusses 
policy implications. 
 
2. Bond markets in Emerging Asia and monetary policy spillovers 
Bond markets play an important role in building a diversified financial system and promoting 
long-term financing to support growth. Since the late 1990s, EMEs have recognized the 
importance of local currency bond markets and promoted their development, especially 
government bond markets (Figure 1).6 In Emerging Asia, local currency government bonds 
have become an increasingly important source of government financing. Foreign investors 
have continuously strengthened their exposure to government bond markets in emerging 
economies (Figure 2). 
 
                                                           
6
 For an overview of efforts in developing local currency bond markets in Asia see Park (forthcoming). 
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[Figures 1 and 2 about here] 
 
Movements in bond yields across the region can be attributed both to fundamental conditions 
in domestic economies and the influence of global factors. Economic growth, inflation and 
fiscal conditions should be mentioned among the main domestic factors (Jaramillo and 
Weber, 2012). Recently, low interest rate environments in the advanced economies resulted 
in favourable liquidity conditions and have driven foreign investors to riskier assets in search 
of higher expected risk-adjusted returns (Belke and Verheyen, 2014). Such portfolio 
rebalancing has lowered risk premiums, boosted asset prices and lowered yields in the 
Emerging Asia, effectively easing the financial conditions in the region and thus, creating 
challenges for their central banks in delivering price and financial stability.  
Along with the portfolio-balance channel, Bauer and Rudebusch (2014) stress the importance 
of the signalling channel starting in 2008. Since large interest rate differentials with respect to 
Emerging Asia were expected to persist over a considerable time period, it has prompted 
carry trades and capital flows into the region. 
Some studies argue that indeed a large part of movements in emerging market spreads are 
due to outside factors such as global liquidity and risk appetite (Gonzales-Rozada and Levy-
Yeyati, 2008). This poses potential adverse effects on Emerging Asia economies if, firstly, 
movements in bond yields are determined more by global factors rather than by changes in 
domestic economic conditions, including domestic monetary policy (Belke and Rees, 2014); 
and secondly, the volatility from global bond markets is transmitted to domestic bond 
markets, posing challenges for financial stability. Indeed, there is now a growing empirical 
literature on international monetary policy transmission, showing that a prolonged period of 
very accommodative monetary policy in the US and other major advanced economies has 
impacted on financial conditions in emerging market economies. 
An early study on the effects of the Fed’s QE policies on Asian economies is Morgan (2011), 
who finds that both rounds of QE between 2009 and 2011 triggered greater flows of capital 
into Emerging Asian markets. In his event study analysis of effects on long-term bond yields, 
Indonesia appears to be the only out of 11 Emerging Asian economies where yields were 
significantly affected. 
Using quarterly data from 2004 to 2010, Moore et al. (2013)study the spillovers of US QE on 
10-year government bond yields of 10 EMEs, including 4 Asian EMEs (Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, Thailand).Their estimates suggest that a decrease in the US 10-year Treasury yield 
by 10 basis points increased the foreign ownership share of EME debt by 0.4 percentage 
points with a negative effect of roughly 1.7 basis points on government bond yields. 
Bowman et al. (2015) analyze the effects of the Fed’s unconventional monetary policies on 
sovereign yields, foreign exchange rates and stock prices in 17 EMEs, 10 of which are from 
Asia (China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, 
Thailand). Their event study findings suggest that US monetary policy shocks significantly 
affect local currency sovereign yields in many countries but that the magnitude and the 
persistence of the effect varies greatly across EMEs. 
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Aizenman et al.(2016) follow a two-step estimation approach using monthly data. They find 
links of both policy interest rates and real effective exchange rates of EMEs with the major 
advanced economies over the last two decades. However, the linkages of stock market price 
changes and sovereign bond spreads between the centre and periphery economies are found 
to be much less robust. 
Miyajima et al. (2014) use monthly data and a panel VAR model to investigate the pass-
through of US monetary policy to five small open Asian economies (Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand), covering two samples, 2003M1–2007M12 and 
2009M06–2013M12. They find significant effects on long-term bond yields, suggesting that 
the control that domestic monetary authorities exert over long-term rates is compromised. 
They also find spillover effects on the growth of bank credit. 
Tillmann (2016) estimates a Qual VAR model à la Dueker (2005) using monthly data for a 
set of Asia-Pacific and Latin American countries for the period from 2007:08 to 2013:03. His 
findings suggest that the Fed’s QE policies increased capital inflows to EMEs, with positive 
effects on EME equity prices and negative effects on EME bond spreads. Tillmann (2016) 
also finds that the effects on EME bond spreads from a typical QE shock are similar to 
spillovers from a cut in the Fed Funds rate. 
Overall, previous studies clearly show that unconventional US monetary policy in the wake 
of the 2007 crisis caused spillovers to Emerging Asian bond markets. We complement the 
existing research by making a number of new contributions in this paper. As mentioned 
earlier, in contrast to most previous research we investigate potential spillovers not only from 
the US but also from the Eurozone and Japan. Moreover, our estimation framework allows us 
to detect spillovers to sovereign long-term bond yields also between EMEs. The use of high 
frequency data allows us to analyze information that is otherwise lost in aggregation and 
analyze the time-variations in the spillovers and detect sudden changes in transmission 
magnitudes. 
 
3. Data and empirical approach 
3.1 Data 
We use daily data of 10-year government bond yields for Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, 
India, China, Thailand, Taiwan, Malaysia, Hong Kong, the US, the Euro area and Japan, 
taken from Thomson Reuters. Due to data availability, the sample includes observations 
starting from 14.05.2003 and ends on 02.09.2016. Additionally, we include logs of daily VIX 
(CBOE Volatility Index) and oil prices as exogenous variables in the model in order to 
disentangle common global shocks. Since Asian markets close before the opening of the US 
market and half-way through the trading day of European markets, we adjust the data for the 
different time zones in line with Ohnsorge et al. (2014), matching US bond yields data with 
the average of the same-day and next-day data for Eurozone and with next-day data for Asia.7 
                                                           
7
 The estimations based on the alternative matching of data, where today’s euro area bond yields correspond to 
the average of same- and next-day data for Asian yields, produce the same results. Moreover, in line with the 
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Using high-frequency (daily) data, whose dynamics are by nature not affected by 
macroeconomic fundamentals, should have an advantage in identifying the spillovers in 
financial markets, where the news are priced rapidly, compared to lower frequency variables. 
Given a sufficiently large number of observations, we are also able to analyze the time-
variations in the spillovers and detect sudden changes in transmission magnitudes. 
Bond yields in advanced and emerging economies have moved closely together in recent 
years, despite differing macroeconomic conditions (Figure 3). We investigate whether this 
co-movement can be attributed to international monetary spillovers, e.g., whether and to what 
extent long-term interest rates in core countries affected long-term interest rates in emerging 
Asia’s countries. 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
From Figure 4 we observe that the three-month interbank interest rate and 10-year 
government bond yield for a country generally show common trends. However, short-term 
interest rates for some countries demonstrate small variation over particular time periods, 
posing difficulties for empirical analysis based on daily frequency data and, thus, on results’ 
reliability. Moreover, daily three-month interbank rates for China are available only from 
09.10.2006, which would also decrease degrees of freedom by VAR analysis. Thus, we will 
proceed with the analysis of long-run interest rates, namely 10-year government bond yields. 
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
3.2 Estimation approach 
In order to estimate the spillovers from bond markets in major advanced economies to 
Emerging Asia we follow the empirical approach proposed by Diebold and Yilmaz (2009, 
2012) based on VAR variance decompositions. 
Firstly, we estimate the VAR(p) model:8 
x = ∑ Φx + ε


  ,      (1) 
where ε ∈ (0, Σ) is the i.i.d. errors vector. 
A VAR-framework allows us to consider all variables as endogenous, which allows, first of 
all, considering non-trivial interlinkages between advanced economies in a proper way. 
Secondly, since EMEs represent a large and rising share of the global economy, there is 
growing evidence of spillbacks from EMEs to advanced economies, primarily through the 
trade, financial and commodity price channels (Rajan, 2014). Analysis conducted by the IMF 
suggests that spillback effects from EMEs tend to be modest, but could be larger in crisis 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
arguments of Ehrmann et al. (2011) we also performed estimations using a 2-day window. The main estimation 
results remain. The obtained results based on different data choices are available upon request. 
8
 Since the yield data display a downward trend for some countries in the sample, we have also performed 
estimations with included time trend in equation (1). However, the results remain robust to the inclusion of the 
trend (see Appendix Figure 1). 
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periods. In addition, the effects are larger for countries or regions with greater trade exposure 
to EMEs, such as Japan and the Euro area (IMF, 2014). Taking into account above mentioned 
considerations the VAR model seems to be a reasonable choice. 
According to economic theory it is plausible that interest rates are mean reverting, i.e. that 
they revert to a long-term equilibrium level as time goes by. However, empirical evidence to 
the stationarity of interest rates is mixed. In our sample, unit root tests indicate that bond 
yields in some countries could be indeed considered as I(1) process, although these results are 
not unambiguous with respect to the choice of unit root test specification9. Moreover, a 
Johansen test indicates the existence of cointegrating relationships in our model, and thus, the 
first difference estimates might be biased because the error-correction term would be omitted. 
In this work, thus, we follow the approach of Sims et al. (1990), who showed that OLS 
estimates of VAR coefficients are consistent under a broad range of circumstances even if the 
variables are nonstationary, and estimate the VAR model in levels. 
The moving-average representation of VAR model can be written as  
x = ∑ Aε

 ,      (2) 
where A = ∑ ΦA


  , Ais theidentity matrix ×and A = 0for i < 0. 
Our further analysis relies on variance decompositions, which allow assessing the fraction of 
the H-step-ahead error variance in forecasting x that is due to shocks tox. In order to deal 
with contemporaneous correlations of VAR shocks, we use the generalized VAR framework, 
which produces variance decompositions invariant to ordering choice. The generalized 
approach allows correlated shocks, taking into account the historically observed distribution 
of errors. Thus, although the method does not identify the causality of spillovers, it relies on 
historical patterns to identify directionality. 
The H-step-ahead forecast error variance decomposition10 is calculated as  
θ

(H =
 !!
"# ∑ ($!
%&'$(
)*"#
'+,
∑ ($!
%&'-&'$!
*"#
'+,
,     (3 
where Σ is the variance matrix for the errors ε, σ is the standard deviation of the error 
term for the i-th equation of VAR and e is a vector which contains one as i-th element and 
zeros otherwise. 
The Total Spillover Index (TSI) is then constructed as: 
TSI(H =
∑ ABC
DE (FG!,(+#
!H(
∑ ABC
DE (FG!,(+#
× 100,      (4) 
where θJK
E(H is normalized value for θ

(H, so that θJK
E(H =
A
!(
D
(F
∑ A
!(
D
(FG(+#
. The total spillover 
index, thus, measures the contribution of spillovers of shocks across variables under 
consideration to the total forecast error variance.  
                                                           
9
 The results of unit root and cointegration tests are available upon request. 
10
 We consider 15 working days ahead forecast error decompositions. 
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In order to investigate the direction of spillovers in yields across countries, i.e. the portion of 
total spillover index that comes from x to all other variables, the directional spillover is 
applied: 
DS→(H =
∑ ACB
DE (FG(+#
(H!
∑ ACB
DE (FG(+#
× 100     (5) 
This approach allows us to investigate changing-over-time dynamics of spillovers in the form 
of rolling regressions, and thus, the time variations of total and directional spillovers during 
the global financial crisis (GFC), the Euro crisis, and implementations of UMPs, which are of 
particular interest in our study. 
 
4. Empirical results 
Our empirical model can be considered as stable. (No root lies outside the unit circle; the max 
root is 0.999483 in modulus.) According to the Akaike information criterion (AIC), we have 
chosen a lag length of 4 (Table 1).11 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Our estimated generalized impulse responses for the model suggest that positive shocks to the 
US, the Euro area and Japan government bond yields result mostly in significant positive 
reactions of other countries’ bond yields during the next 15 working days (Figures 5 to 7). 
Only in a few cases we observe insignificant reactions, i.e., the impulse responses for China’s 
bonds to US shocks; Indonesia and China’s bonds to Euro area shocks; India, Indonesia, the 
Philippines and China’s bonds to Japan’s shocks.12 Altogether, our estimated generalized 
impulse response functions make sense with regard to significance and sign. In the following, 
we will concentrate on variance decompositions and the associated spillover measures. 
 
[Figures 5, 6 and 7 about here] 
 
The Total Spillover Index (TSI) for all countries under consideration over the whole sample 
is 23.1% (Table 2). Spillovers from major advanced economies (US, Euro area and Japan) 
explain a significant proportion of the variation in both advanced and emerging Asian 
economies’ bond yields. About 14% of the variation in Asian EMEs’ is attributable to 
spillovers from advanced economies, whereas only 5% are due to shocks generated by other 
emerging markets (remaining 81% are the contributions of own shocks). Almost 60% among 
the aforementioned spillovers from core to emerging markets can be traced back to the US, 
while nearly 30% and 10% stem from the Euro area and Japan respectively. 
 
[Table 2 about here]
                                                           
11
 As a robustness check, we selected a lag length of 2 according to the BIC. See Section 5. 
12
 A discussion of our results for China follows below. 
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According to Table 2, three “Asian tigers” – Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan – are the 
countries that are most prone to long-term interest rate spillovers from advanced countries. 
Bond markets in the Philippines and China are the least affected by other countries during the 
time under consideration. However, these results should be taken with caution, since Table 2 
provides only “average” spillover effects over the time period starting from 2003. As we will 
see later in our time-consistency analysis, both China and Indonesia experienced significant 
spillovers from advanced countries since 2011. 
China seems to be an exceptional case in our sample of countries, since shocks to China’s 
yields also do not contribute to the variation of other countries’ yields. That is, despite her 
weight in the regional and global economy, international spillovers from China’s bond 
markets appear limited for the time being, a result of the relatively small size of China’s 
sovereign bond market and also a consequence of the still comprehensive controls on 
portfolio investment flows. 
Spillovers from other emerging countries (namely from Philippines and Thailand) explain 
more variation in Indonesia’s bond yields than spillovers from core countries. This could be 
seen as a sign of growing regional financial market integration. All other countries 
demonstrate strong linkages to the US and the Euro area, whereas spillovers to Emerging 
Asia from Japan are of lesser importance. Table 2 provides the static representation of total 
and directional spillovers, so that obtained measures could be considered as “average” over 
the whole sample. However, the time under consideration is highly turbulent on historical 
standards: for the last decade, the world economy has gone through many momentous 
occasions such as the global financial crisis of 2008, the European debt crisis, and advanced 
economies’ implementation of UMPs. In order to analyze the time-variations in the spillovers 
and detect sudden changes in magnitudes, we continue with the analysis of spillover 
dynamics by means of rolling estimations (Figures 8 and 9).13 
 
[Figures 8 and 9 about here] 
 
The spillovers are indeed not constant over time. From Table 2 we observe that a large 
portion of the “average” total spillover index belongs to the spillovers across advanced 
countries, indicating highly integrated financial markets across advanced countries and their 
strong inter-linkages. Since in this study we are particularly interested in spillovers to 
Emerging Asia, we continue with an analysis of directional spillover indices from each of the 
major advanced economies to Asian economies. 
Figure 9 shows the long-term interest rate pass-through for each country from all other 
countries under consideration. Along with the contributions of advanced countries, the 
interlinkages in the regional bond markets are also displayed. While for Hong Kong and 
South Korea bond markets spillovers come mainly from advanced economies, a relative large 
portion of the spillovers facing Malaysia and the Philippines come from Emerging Asia’ 
regional bond markets. 
                                                           
13
 The rolling window is chosen to be 700 working days. 
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Spillovers from the US 
Figure 10 shows that in the pre-2008 global crisis period the spillovers from the US to 
Emerging Asia were increasing. However, in 2008 the contribution of US bond market 
shocks to Emerging bond markets’ variation started to decrease. This in turn has changed 
abruptly with the announcement of the QE1 program and the index increased almost 
immediately from near 90 to 140 points. The effect did not appear to be stable over time and 
spillovers were slowly decreasing since then. This has changed once again in the times of 
QE2 announcements, and the spillovers from US bond market grew almost steadily until the 
end of the program. Alongside the first forward guidance and operational twist 
announcements, the spillovers remained on the same level, and then decreased. The time span 
between the forward guidance announcement on January 25, 2012, and Bernanke’s testimony 
to the Congress (“taper tantrum”) on May 22, 2013, was quite volatile, whereas the latter 
resulted in growth of US-Emerging Asia yields spillovers. After the QE3 program was 
finished and until the Fed had increased the interest rates, the US yields spilled intensively 
over emerging Asia. Taken together, from the dynamic pattern we clearly observe that 
sudden changes of intensity in the US bond market spillovers coincide with specific policy 
announcements. The increase of the spillovers during the implementations of low interest rate 
policies is in line with the search-for-yield hypothesis (Belke and Rees, 2014). The results are 
also consistent with the findings of Obstfeld (2015) that US monetary policy has been to an 
increasing extent transmitted to Asia through global bond markets. 
 
[Figure 10 about here] 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
So far, we have analyzed the dynamic behaviour of US bond market spillover to Emerging 
Asia bonds taken all together. The next question which arises is whether countries in 
Emerging Asia display common reactions to US long term interest rates shocks. Thus, we 
will have a look at the pairwise directional spillovers from US to each of the Asian country 
under consideration (Figure 11). 
 
[Figure 11 about here] 
 
Indonesia, China and the Philippines started to be exposed to relative large spillovers from 
US government bonds only in 2011, thus the results obtained for these countries from Table 1 
“hide” last years’ developments. From May 2013, the time of Bernanke’s tapering speech, 
Indonesia was hit particularly hard among South-East Asian markets in 2013; its heavy 
reliance on external finance and declining exports due to weak commodity prices left it 
vulnerable to external shocks, making it one the so-called “Fragile Five” (along with Brazil, 
India, Turkey and South Africa). Hong Kong, whose currency is fixed to the US dollar 
through a currency board arrangement, also experienced sizable spillover effects from the 
US. 
SOAS Department of Economics Working Paper No 202 – 2017 
 
10 
 
Spillovers from Japan 
Figure 12 demonstrates that after the introduction of the BOJ’s Quantitative and Qualitative 
Monetary Easing (QQE) policy in April 2013, the total spillover index from Japan has been 
in an upward trend. However, directional spillovers from Japan are shown to be very 
heterogeneous across countries, although Taiwan, Korea and Hong Kong show to some 
extent similarities in reactions to Japanese shocks (Figure 13). The election of Prime Minister 
Abe in December of 2012 and the BOJ’s anticipated regime shift with the arrival of its new 
governor Haruhiko Kuroda in March 2013 caused quite sizable spillovers to the Philippine, 
Indonesian and Thai bond yields but did not have any notable impact on China or India. The 
BOJ’s decision to impose negative rates on certain reserves that financial institutions deposit 
at the central bank in January 2016 had more sizable effects across the region. 
 
[Figures 12 and 13 about here] 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
Spillovers from the Euro area 
Total directional spillovers from the Eurozone were on the decline between 2008 and the first 
quarter of 2010. However, with the outbreak of the euro crisis in spring 2010, spillovers from 
the Eurozone started to increase again (Figure 14), even though they never reached the pre-
2008 crisis level. Similarly to Japan’s case, one can notice a recent increase in contributions 
of Eurozone yield shocks to the Asian EMEs yields, corroborating the view of the Asian 
Development Bank (2014) that more expansionary measures introduced by BOJ and ECB 
could offset the impact on liquidity conditions caused by the end of the Fed’s zero interest 
rate policy in December 2015. 
 
[Figure 14 about here] 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
Directional spillovers from the Euro area vary greatly across Emerging Asian countries and 
are volatile (Figure 15). Figure 15 shows significant spillovers from the Eurozone to India 
starting 2007 till 2009, firstly, due to increasing foreign institutional investment in 2007-08, 
and secondly, due to withdrawal of capital from India’s financial markets in 2008-09. Since 
then the spillovers from the euro bond market decreased until the ECB started to implement 
its Securities Markets Program (SMP) in May 2010. From the second half of 2010, the 
spillovers remained stable at a low level. Euro area spillovers to Thailand were relatively 
stable (with a slight increase due to SMP implementation) over the period up until mid-2011, 
when the Thai economy was hit hard by a flood crisis, which apparently coincided with a 
drop of spillovers from Euro area. However, after ECB President Mario Draghi’s now 
famous “Whatever it takes” speech on July 20, 2012, the spillovers to Thailand started to 
continuously increase again. ECB announcements of a number of non-standard monetary 
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policy measures in early August 2011 resulted in an increase of spillovers to Malaysia, 
Philippines, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Korea. The July 2012 speech by Mario Draghi also 
resulted in a substantial increase of spillovers to China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and South 
Korea. The start of the ECB’s Expanded Asset Purchase program in 2015 resulted in a 
gradual increase in pairwise directional spillovers to Indonesia, Philippines, Hong Kong and 
Korea. 
 
[Figure 15 about here] 
 
Spillovers from China 
Given the growing role of the Chinese economy in the region and the world economy at 
large, we may briefly look into spillovers from China’s bond yields to yields of other 
Emerging Asian economies. As already mentioned when we discussed the results for our 
spillover index for all countries for the whole sample period reported in Table 2, long-term 
bond yields across Emerging Asia have stayed completely unaffected by Chinese bond 
yields. Given that the spillover index presented is an average for a period ranging from May 
14, 2003 to September 2, 2016 – a period during which the size of China’s local currency 
bond markets increased substantially (from US$ 371.19 bn or 23.9% of GDP in June 2003 to 
US$ 4,969 bn or 45.9% of GDP in September 2016) and capital controls were gradually 
relaxed, one may expect that spillovers have increased over time. However, as can be seen in 
Figure 16, this has not been the case. The spillover index has remained at a very low level 
throughout, suggesting that even in September 2016, Chinese bond market developments 
have no impact on the other markets in the region. This does of course not imply that 
developments in Chinese financial markets do not matter for the rest of Asia – as illustrated 
by the stock market upheavals in 2015-16 they do –, but for the time being bond markets 
apparently do not. Looking forward, one may expect this to change with a growing 
importance of the renminbi-denominated assets in regional financial markets and a potential 
further opening up of China’s capital markets. 
 
[Figure 16 about here] 
 
To sum up, our chosen estimation approach has allowed us to trace the evolution of spillovers 
over time. For example, one can see that for China, Indonesia and Philippines monetary 
independence from US and Eurozone shocks becomes compromised only starting 2010-2011, 
whereas other Emerging Asian countries were more or less prone to spillovers from US bond 
markets over the whole time period under consideration. Thus, we have been able to identify 
potential structural breaks which should be taken into account in further research on this 
topic. 
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5. Robustness checks 
We conducted a number of robustness tests in order to check whether our results are sensitive 
to the model specification and the choice of model parameters. 
 
5.1 Robustness check with respect to model specification 
Bellas et al. (2010), among others, argue that the measures of market sentiment and global 
risk aversion explain a large fraction of EME sovereign bonds. In our baseline specification 
we have investigated the long-term interest rate spillovers that are additional to those of the 
VIX by including the VIX as exogenous variable. However, the global risk aversion itself 
might be influenced by changes in advanced countries’ interest rates (Rey, 2013; Rey, 2014). 
Thus, in our first modification we have included the VIX (as well as oil prices) in an 
endogenous set of variables (Table 6). The pattern of co-movements in bond yields between 
advanced and emerging countries quantitatively did not change compared to the baseline 
model. Not surprisingly, we observe a significant impact of the VIX on bond yields almost 
for all countries. However, the VIX itself is affected only by US and Eurozone bond markets. 
What is more, the oil price spillovers to the bond markets are minor. 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
In a second modification we control for the possible linkages between bond yields and 
exchange rates. Gadanecz et al. (2014) found that exchange rate risk is a key determinant of 
EME sovereign bond yields, and could amplify the negative impacts of domestic and 
international factors on bond yields. In order to compensate the uncertainty about the stability 
and future paths of exchange rates, investors will demand a larger risk premium and, thus, 
affect EME local currency sovereign bond yields.  
In the first setup we have added nominal effective exchange rates (NEERs) for each 
Emerging Asian country (using data from Thomson Reuters Datastream) in the list of 
endogenous variables (Figure 17). In order to save degrees of freedom, in our second setup 
we include only the first principal component (FPC) of NEERs, which according to the 
principal component analysis presented in Table 7 explains more than 50% of NEER 
fluctuations in the region. This first component, thus, measures common fluctuations in 
exchange rate developments across the region. According to the results presented in Tables 8 
and 9, the interconnections across bond markets remain stable after controlling for exchange 
rates. 
 
[Figure 17 about here] 
 
[Tables 7, 8 and 9 about here] 
 
Figure 18 shows the dynamics of total spillover and directional spillover indices from the 
United States, the Eurozone and Japan for all model specifications discussed above. For the 
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Eurozone and Japan spillovers the results are similar across models. With respect to the US 
spillovers and the Total Spillover Index (TSI) we see more divergent behaviour, although the 
main turning points, which were discussed in Section 4,are still preserved. 
 
[Figure 18 about here] 
 
5.2 Robustness check with respect to the choice of model parameters 
Firstly, we have examined alternative lag orders of 2, 4 and 8, chosen according to the 
different criteria presented in Table 1. It turns out that the total and directional spillovers in 
their levels and time variations are robust to different lag choices (Figure 19). 
 
[Figure 19 about here] 
 
Secondly, we consider different forecast horizons – 10, 15 and 20 working days. The 
estimated spillovers again display robust dynamics (Figure 20). 
 
[Figure 20 about here] 
 
Overall, the sensitivity tests show that our model is to a large extent robust both to the 
inclusion of additional variables and different choices of the model’s parameters. We thus 
feel consider our basic findings in section 4 as reliable. 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this contribution we have investigated the extent to which changes of long-term interest 
rates in major advanced economies have affected long-term government bond yields in 
Emerging Asia. To gauge long-term interest spillover effects, we have employed VAR 
variance decompositions derived from high frequency data. Our results reveal that sovereign 
bond yields in Emerging Asia at times responded significantly to changes to US and Euro 
area bond yields, although the magnitudes turned out to be heterogeneous across countries. 
This may indicate to the different transmission and adjustment mechanisms in Emerging 
Asian economies, which could in turn explain the cross-countries differences in 
macroeconomic performance, e.g., output and credit growth. Spillovers from Japan were also 
sizable for a few Southeast Asian countries, but at a lower magnitude. In all cases, the 
magnitude of spillovers varied over time. The pattern of these variations can partially be 
attributed to the implementation of different unconventional monetary policy measures in 
advanced countries. Generally, we observe the intensification of spillover effects on 
emerging markets during the UMPs, supporting the notion of the “New Normal” for the 
recent international financial system. 
Our finding clearly suggest that the notion of a “decoupling” of Emerging Asian economies 
and financial markets from the US and also Europe remains an illusion. Spillovers from US 
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bond markets in particular were sizable already before the start of the Fed’s UMPs, and they 
have become larger since. It is also notable that we do not find any evidence of a growing 
importance of spillovers from China’s bond markets to the rest of region. 
While calls have been made by Asian policy makers for greater international monetary 
coordination to limit such spillovers (e.g., Rajan, 2014), the mandate for achieving domestic 
economic targets for both the Fed and the ECB effectively limits substantial international 
monetary cooperation to exceptional circumstances, such as financial upheavals of a global 
scale. The implication is that Emerging Asian economies will have to continue learning to 
live with such policy spillovers.14 If central banks are constrained in their ability to control 
domestic long-term interest rates, the whole arsenal of macro-prudential policies has to be 
used to try to control domestic credit creation and safeguard long-term financial stability. 
 
                                                           
14
 For a recent analysis of East Asian economies’ efforts at dealing with QE spillovers see Saiki et al. (2016). 
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Table 1: Empirical realizations of lag length choice criteria 
 
Source: Own estimations. 
 
Lag LogL
Sequential 
modified LR 
test statistic
Final 
prediction 
error
Akaike 
information 
criterion
Schwarz 
information 
criterion
Hannan-Quinn 
information 
criterion
0 -22446.08 NA 7.18E-10 13.0006 13.1497 13.0539
1 62605.04 169169.8 3.79E-31 -35.9937 -35.5891 -35.8492
2 64036.55 2837.416 1.80E-31 -36.7366 -36.0765* -36.5010*
3 64254.40 430.2834 1.73E-31 -36.7792 -35.8635 -36.4523
4 64401.76 290.0559 1.72E-31* -36.7812* -35.6099 -36.3630
5 64511.50 215.2405 1.76E-31 -36.7614 -35.3346 -36.2520
6 64614.47 201.2435 1.80E-31 -36.7377 -35.0554 -36.1370
7 64732.00 228.8783 1.83E-31 -36.7224 -34.7846 -36.0305
8 64857.51 243.5701* 1.85E-31 -36.7118 -34.5184 -35.9286
* indicates lag order selected by the criterion
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Table 2: Spillovers over the sample period May 14, 2003 to September 2, 2016 
 
Source: Own estimations. 
India Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand Taiwan Hong Kong China Eurozone Japan USA From Others
India 91.4 0.14 0.66 0.3 0.03 0.29 0.5 0.39 0.03 1.93 0.02 4.31 8.6
Indonesia 0.11 90.24 0.11 0.2 5.36 2.39 0.05 0.05 0.1 0.05 0.23 1.09 9.8
Korea 0.41 0.6 74.27 0.12 0.25 1.62 1.3 0.66 0.02 7.06 1.16 12.55 25.7
Malaysia 0.56 0.65 1.25 85.87 0.31 1.43 0.72 2.6 0.03 2.17 0.42 3.99 14.1
Philippines 0.08 1.2 0.14 0.33 97.27 0.03 0.11 0.18 0.01 0.16 0 0.49 2.7
Thailand 0.38 1.46 1.66 0.86 0.24 76.45 2.02 2.06 0.01 4.78 2.94 7.14 23.5
Taiwan 0.48 0.02 0.1 0.06 0.02 0.08 72.76 5 0.14 6.42 4.94 9.98 27.2
Hong Kong 0.14 0.36 0.46 0.07 0.34 0.58 0.66 42.9 0.21 16.52 2.83 34.94 57.1
China 0.61 0.23 0.65 0.07 0.07 0.51 0.44 0.06 97.08 0.09 0.16 0.03 2.9
Eurozone 0.06 0.22 0.32 0.28 0.01 0.25 0.56 1.31 0.01 60.33 3.49 33.16 39.7
Japan 0.03 0.13 0.5 0.23 0.01 0.12 0.93 1.37 0.17 13.25 67.41 15.83 32.6
USA 0.17 0.9 0.18 0.07 0.02 0.25 0.45 1.41 0.03 27.02 3.07 66.44 33.6
Contribution to others 3 5.9 6 2.6 6.7 7.5 7.7 15.1 0.8 79.5 19.3 123.5 277.6
Contribution including own 94.4 96.2 80.3 88.5 103.9 84 80.5 58 97.8 139.8 86.7 190 23.10%
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Table 3: US monetary policy events 
Date Description 
09.15.2008 Lehman collapse 
11.25.2008 The Fed announces the purchases of MBS backed by government agencies, and the creation of TALF 
12.01.2008 Bernanke’s speech (“Federal Reserve Policies in the Financial Crisis”) hints future Treasury purchases 
12.16.2008 FOMC statement: The Fed cuts the target Federal Funds rate to zero 
01.28.2009 FOMC statement: The Fed announces the PDCF, the TLSF and the AMFL 
03.18.2009 FOMC statement: The Fed extends its purchases of MBS and announces that will start to purchase Treasury securities 
03.31.2010 Completion of QE1 
08.10.2010 FOMC statement The Fed announces his willing to buy long-term Treasury securities through 
reinvestment of payments of its MBS 
08.27.2010 Bernanke’s speech at Jackson Hole 
09.21.2010 FOMC statement According to the FOMC, the short-term interest rate will stay at low levels for a long period of time 
10.15.2010 Speech (Indiana) According to Chairman Bernanke, new measures might be necessary 
11.03.2010 QE2 announced 
06.30.2011 QE2 completed 
08.09.2011 Forward Guidance* - “Economic conditions...are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate for at least through mid-2013” 
08.26.2011 Bernanke’s speech at Jackson Hole: refusal to pledge more QEs 
09.21.2011 FOMC statement: The Fed announces its Maturity Expansion Program 
01.25.2012 Forward Guidance* - “Economic conditions...are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate for at least through late 2014" 
06.20.2012 Operation Twist extended 
08.31.2012 Speech (Jackson Hole) Chairman Bernanke suggests new QE 
09.13.2012 FOMC statement: The Fed announces new Quantitative Easing 
03.20.2013 FOMC statement: The Fed will continue its accommodative monetary policy until certain goals of 
unemployment and inflation are reached 
05.22.2013 FOMC minutes and testimony Bernanke suggests the end of expansive monetary policy, “taper tantrum” 
06.19.2013 FOMC statement The Fed suggests that “tapering” could begin next year 
09.18.2013 Tapering delayed 
12.18.2013 Tapering of QE3 announced  
06.18.2014 
“If incoming information broadly supports the Committee’s expectation of ongoing improvement 
in labour market conditions and inflation moving back towards its longer-run objective, the 
Committee will likely reduce the pace of asset purchases in further measured steps at future 
meetings” 
10.29.2014 End of QE3 announced, start of “indefinite” forward guidance 
12.15.2015 
The FOMC raised the Fed funds rate 1/4 point, to 0.25% - 0.5%. It will continue to raise rates 
gradually in 2016, as long as the economy continues to improve. It raised the discount rate by a 
1/4 point to 1.0%. It raised the interest rate paid on excess and required reserves by 1/4 point to 
0.5% 
Source: Compiled by authors. 
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Table 4: Japanese monetary policy events 
Date Description 
19.12.2008 On Monetary Policy Decisions: Additional Measures regarding Money Market Operation Tools. Lowering of the Bank’s target for the uncollateralized overnight call rate by 20 basis points;  
01.12.2009 Enhancement of Easy Monetary Conditions. Introduction of a new funds-supplying operation: Fixed loan interest rate (the target for the uncollateralized overnight call rate: 0.1 percent 
18.12.2009 Clarification of the “Understanding of Medium- to Long-Term Price Stability” 
05.10.2010 Comprehensive Monetary Easing 
05.11.2012 Abe’s announcement to conduct unlimited quantitative easing 
22.01.2013 The “2% Price Stability Target” under the Framework for the Conduct MP 
04.04.2013 Introduction of the “Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary Easing” (QQE) policy 
31.10.2014 Expansion of the Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary Easing (QQE) 
29.01.2016 Introduction of “Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary Easing (QQE) with a Negative Interest Rate” 
Source: Compiled by authors. 
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Table 5: Euro area monetary policy events 
Date Description 
22.08.2007 Supplementary liquidity-providing longer-term refinancing operation (LTRO) with a maturity of three months 
28.03.2008 LTROs with a maturity of six months 
07.05.2009 LTROs with a maturity of one year 
10.05.2010 Securities Markets Program (SMP) 
09.06.2011 MROs as fixed-rate tender procedures with full allotment (FRFA) for as long as necessary, at least 
until October 2011 
08.08.2011 ECB will actively implement its Securities Market Program 
26.07.2012 “Whatever it takes” speech by ECB President Mario Draghi in London 
02.08.2012 Outright Monetary Transactions program (OMT) 
04.07.2013 Open-ended forward guidance: The Governing Council expects the key ECB interest rates to 
remain at present or lower levels for an extended period of time 
08.11.2013 FRFA on MROs as long as necessary, and at least until July 2015 
05.06.2014 Targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs) 
22.01.2015 Expanded asset purchase program (including PSPP) 
03.12.2015 Duration of Expanded Asset Purchase program extended (among others) 
16.03.2016 Monthly purchases under Expanded asset purchase program increased (among others) 
Source: Adapted from Bernoth et al. (2016). 
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Table 6: Results for the specification with VIX and oil prices considered as endogeneous 
variables15 
Source: Own calculations 
 
                                                           
15
 The numbers in brackets present the results for the model with oil prices taken as exogenous variables. 
India Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand Taiwan Hong Kong China Eurozone Japan USA VIX OIL From Others
India 91.84(92.73) 0.13(0.11) 0.71(0.69) 0.36(0.36) 0.04(0.04) 0.31(0.29) 0.47(0.46) 0.42(0.35) 0.04(0.03) 1.45(1.45) 0.02(0.01) 3.54(3.45) 0.01 (0.02) 0.67 8.2(7.3)
Indonesia 0.08(0.06) 87.08(87.48) 0.18(0.19) 0.26(0.26) 5.09(5.02) 1.81(1.83) 0.06(0.06) 0.18(0.18) 0.1(0.09) 0.5(0.48) 0.17(0.16) 0.18(0.17) 4.16(4.03) 0.15 12.9(12.5)
Korea 0.57(0.43) 0.59(0.64) 74.08(75.3) 0.12(0.12) 0.21(0.25) 1.62(1.56) 1.28(1.27) 0.68(0.59) 0.01(0.02) 6.48(6.46) 1.2(1.18) 11.75(11.58) 0.81(0.59) 0.61 25.9(24.7)
Malaysia 0.63(0.59) 0.63(0.69) 1.38(1.33) 86.32(86.91) 0.28(0.3) 1.36(1.32) 0.69(0.69) 2.51(2.4) 0.04(0.04) 1.84(1.82) 0.47(0.45) 3.52(3.4) 0.08(0.05) 0.23 13.7(13.1)
Philippines 0.05(0.06) 1.27(1.32) 0.19(0.18) 0.42(0.42) 96.09(96.16) 0.03(0.03) 0.15(0.16) 0.09(0.08) 0.01(0.01) 0.04(0.03) 0(0) 0.08(0.06) 1.39(1.5) 0.2 3.9(3.8)
Thailand 0.43(0.39) 1.38(1.44) 1.74(1.7) 0.85(0.86) 0.18(0.22) 73.77(75.45) 2.06(2.03) 2.12(1.97) 0.01(0.01) 4.82(4.83) 3.07(3.05) 7.35(7.22) 1.13(0.84) 1.1 26.2(24.6)
Taiwan 0.43(0.47) 0.02(0.02) 0.1(0.1) 0.07(0.07) 0.03(0.03) 0.07(0.07) 70.05(70.37) 4.9(4.85) 0.13(0.13) 6.48(6.48) 4.83(4.84) 10.07(10.03) 2.64(2.55) 0.19 30(29.6)
Hong Kong 0.14(0.14) 0.34(0.32) 0.44(0.45) 0.07(0.07) 0.29(0.29) 0.5(0.5) 0.63(0.63) 39.95(40.03) 0.2(0.21) 16.05(15.99) 2.77(2.76) 33.52(33.51) 5.06(5.11) 0.03 60.1(60)
China 0.65(0.59) 0.25(0.25) 0.63(0.62) 0.06(0.06) 0.08(0.07) 0.55(0.53) 0.48(0.47) 0.09(0.08) 96.12(96.34) 0.17(0.16) 0.16(0.15) 0.08(0.07) 0.66(0.6) 0.04 3.9(3.7)
Eurozone 0.06(0.06) 0.22(0.21) 0.31(0.32) 0.26(0.26) 0.01(0.01) 0.22(0.22) 0.53(0.53) 1.19(1.22) 0.01(0.01) 57.28(57.24) 3.36(3.37) 31.3(31.33) 5.16(5.23) 0.1 42.7(42.8)
Japan 0.02(0.03) 0.11(0.12) 0.51(0.49) 0.23(0.23) 0.01(0.01) 0.12(0.12) 0.92(0.91) 1.39(1.33) 0.14(0.16) 13.09(13.1) 65.09(65.44) 15.77(15.67) 2.57(2.4) 0.03 34.9(34.6)
USA 0.16(0.15) 0.8(0.77) 0.15(0.15) 0.07(0.07) 0.02(0.02) 0.22(0.22) 0.42(0.42) 1.3(1.32) 0.02(0.02) 25.03(25) 2.77(2.77) 60.85(60.88) 8.17(8.21) 0.02 39.1(39.1)
VIX 0.13(0.1) 0.38(0.41) 0.27(0.25) 0.43(0.43) 0.07(0.07) 0.28(0.29) 0.2(0.2) 0.66(0.7) 0.01(0.01) 7.48(7.46) 0.07(0.07) 11.22(11.25) 78.78(78.76) 0.02 21.2(21.2)
OIL 2.07 0.22 0.34 0.03 0.3 0.2 0.07 0.94 0.57 0.29 0.23 0.71 3.57 90.47 9.5
Contribution to others 5.4(3.1) 6.3(6.3) 6.9(6.5) 3.2(3.2) 6.6(6.3) 7.3(7) 8(7.8) 16.5(15.1) 1.3(0.7) 83.7(83.3) 19.1(18.8) 129.1(127.7) 35.4(31.1) 3.4 332.2(316.9)
Contribution including own 97.3(95.8) 93.4(93.8) 81(81.8) 89.5(90.1) 102.7(102.5) 81.1(82.4) 78(78.2) 56.4(55.1) 97.4(97.1) 141(140.5) 84.2(84.2) 189.9(188.6) 114.2(109.9) 93.9 23.7%(24.4%)
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Table 7: Principle component analysis 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Eigenvalue 4.68 1.52 1.24 0.87 0.44 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.02
Proportion 0.52 0.17 0.14 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
Cumulative 0.52 0.69 0.83 0.92 0.97 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.00
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Table 8: The results for the specification augmented with NEERs 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
IN_yield ID_yield KO_yield MY_yield PH_yield TH_yield TW_yield HK_yield CH_yield EZ_yield JP_yield US_yield IN_NEER ID_NEER KO_NEER MY_NEER PH_NEER TH_NEER TW_NEER HK_NEER CH_NEER From Others
IN_yield 89.84 0.04 0.47 0.23 0.33 0.30 0.50 0.89 0.02 1.63 0.05 3.61 0.32 0.01 0.56 0.25 0.18 0.01 0.34 0.13 0.28 10.20
ID_yield 0.03 60.62 0.19 0.03 2.24 1.34 0.08 0.29 0.08 0.10 0.41 0.20 0.81 3.72 11.96 0.29 0.83 0.02 0.08 8.04 8.65 39.40
KO_yield 0.28 0.58 73.42 0.13 0.18 1.97 1.42 0.38 0.07 7.27 0.59 11.19 0.06 0.26 0.06 0.02 0.11 0.23 0.50 0.40 0.86 26.60
MY_yield 0.57 0.19 1.10 77.18 0.46 1.91 0.95 2.40 0.02 2.72 0.64 6.75 0.04 0.13 0.02 1.23 0.04 0.33 0.05 2.02 1.27 22.80
PH_yield 0.16 0.88 0.09 0.33 86.52 0.05 0.13 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.25 0.18 0.02 0.18 3.90 0.03 1.45 0.05 0.09 3.24 2.34 13.50
TH_yield 0.45 1.40 1.60 0.95 0.05 76.57 2.15 1.97 0.01 3.86 2.95 6.00 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.72 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.50 0.52 23.40
TW_yield 0.60 0.02 0.20 0.04 0.02 0.10 66.12 3.91 0.22 6.13 5.61 9.65 0.11 0.66 1.09 1.04 1.44 0.80 1.55 0.16 0.52 33.90
HK_yield 0.12 0.35 0.61 0.10 0.35 0.68 0.37 37.01 0.53 16.74 2.36 32.51 0.37 0.87 1.43 0.73 0.92 0.94 1.71 0.63 0.66 63.00
CH_yield 0.73 0.95 0.39 0.01 0.07 1.21 1.57 1.08 89.78 1.20 0.16 0.90 0.29 0.13 0.11 0.01 0.13 0.30 0.02 0.50 0.46 10.20
EZ_yield 0.12 0.74 0.42 0.08 0.14 0.17 0.38 0.90 0.19 58.45 3.40 31.28 0.09 0.35 0.83 0.12 0.79 0.93 0.40 0.07 0.12 41.50
JP_yield 0.05 0.11 0.34 0.06 0.29 0.10 0.80 0.68 0.04 12.82 63.25 14.22 0.90 1.07 0.84 0.63 0.83 1.14 1.12 0.41 0.32 36.70
US_yield 0.14 0.87 0.20 0.01 0.02 0.15 0.27 0.74 0.16 26.11 2.66 61.38 0.41 0.48 1.53 0.90 0.76 1.45 1.37 0.19 0.20 38.60
IN_NEER 0.94 1.26 0.05 0.03 0.10 0.71 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.58 0.31 0.83 69.99 2.11 3.71 5.16 7.05 3.10 3.34 0.34 0.34 30.00
ID_NEER 0.21 2.83 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.18 0.21 0.67 0.05 0.77 1.01 0.33 3.27 68.12 4.71 7.24 5.83 0.74 2.83 0.40 0.42 31.90
KO_NEER 0.07 1.26 0.04 0.14 0.31 0.24 0.25 1.08 0.05 1.90 1.32 3.24 0.75 0.17 59.87 1.19 3.01 0.19 3.18 8.69 13.04 40.10
MY_NEER 0.12 0.55 0.05 0.91 0.01 0.96 0.31 0.13 0.00 0.75 0.04 1.77 3.20 4.06 4.47 66.67 7.89 1.12 5.53 1.12 0.32 33.30
PH_NEER 0.05 0.24 0.04 0.68 0.13 0.04 0.38 0.20 0.05 1.53 0.86 2.57 7.24 4.42 4.57 8.34 59.38 4.21 2.97 1.13 0.97 40.60
TH_NEER 0.01 0.43 0.03 0.42 0.21 0.01 0.15 0.02 0.18 0.76 0.14 2.30 3.28 1.25 0.95 2.42 3.00 81.76 0.97 0.84 0.88 18.20
TW_NEER 0.12 0.08 0.01 0.07 0.31 0.01 0.62 0.01 0.15 0.77 0.19 4.12 3.11 1.20 6.76 3.00 3.99 1.29 73.70 0.21 0.27 26.30
HK_NEER 0.01 0.17 0.07 0.01 0.46 0.15 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.30 0.02 0.68 0.81 2.98 1.84 1.46 2.26 1.85 2.16 52.87 31.84 47.10
CH_NEER 0.11 0.30 0.10 0.03 0.24 0.09 0.17 0.01 0.22 0.39 0.00 0.41 0.92 2.61 2.91 2.68 1.95 1.76 2.05 30.86 52.15 47.90
Contribution to others 4.90 13.20 6.10 4.30 6.00 10.30 10.80 15.40 2.10 86.30 23.00 132.70 26.00 26.70 52.30 37.50 42.50 20.60 30.30 59.90 64.30 675.40
Contribution including own 94.70 73.90 79.50 81.50 92.50 86.90 76.90 52.40 91.90 144.80 86.20 194.10 96.00 94.80 112.20 104.10 101.90 102.40 104.00 112.80 116.40 32.20%
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Table 9: The results for the specification augmented with the FPC for NEERs 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
IN_yield ID_yield KO_yield MY_yield PH_yield TH_yield TW_yield HK_yield CH_yield EZ_yield JP_yield US_yield factor From Others
IN_yield 92.33 0.09 0.71 0.29 0.05 0.23 0.54 0.40 0.01 1.67 0.02 3.65 0.02 7.70
ID_yield 0.04 85.85 0.21 0.29 5.30 1.81 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.38 0.16 0.18 5.54 14.10
KO_yield 0.45 0.65 74.98 0.12 0.27 1.52 1.35 0.67 0.04 6.68 1.18 11.79 0.29 25.00
MY_yield 0.59 0.50 1.11 85.09 0.38 1.59 0.96 3.07 0.02 2.06 0.36 3.97 0.31 14.90
PH_yield 0.05 1.47 0.17 0.31 96.69 0.03 0.10 0.20 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.12 0.74 3.30
TH_yield 0.38 1.15 1.36 0.80 0.28 76.99 2.04 2.20 0.02 4.65 2.49 7.59 0.05 23.00
TW_yield 0.61 0.02 0.10 0.05 0.02 0.09 71.02 4.63 0.11 6.11 4.66 10.02 2.56 29.00
HK_yield 0.10 0.23 0.31 0.10 0.38 0.93 0.50 41.75 0.36 15.56 2.27 34.98 2.52 58.30
CH_yield 0.64 0.73 0.44 0.08 0.08 0.60 1.29 0.32 94.84 0.41 0.14 0.35 0.07 5.20
EZ_yield 0.11 0.23 0.31 0.12 0.00 0.36 0.36 1.20 0.04 59.77 3.32 32.78 1.39 40.20
JP_yield 0.05 0.17 0.52 0.12 0.01 0.14 0.73 1.20 0.04 12.77 66.47 15.38 2.41 33.50
US_yield 0.13 0.70 0.12 0.02 0.03 0.42 0.34 1.33 0.06 25.82 2.62 65.49 2.92 34.50
factor 0.18 3.85 0.01 1.55 0.48 0.31 0.41 0.18 0.01 2.98 1.10 8.57 80.38 19.60
Contribution to others 3.30 9.80 5.40 3.80 7.30 8.00 8.70 15.50 0.90 79.10 18.30 129.40 18.80 308.40
Contribution including own 95.60 95.60 80.40 88.90 104.00 85.00 79.70 57.20 95.80 138.90 84.80 194.90 99.20 23.70%
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Figure 1: Local currency government bonds as share of GDP
Source: AsianBondsOnline,https://asianbondsonline.adb.org/regional/data.php
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Figure 2: Foreign holdings of local currency government bonds in selected Asian 
countries (% of total) 
Source: AsianBondsOnline,https://asianbondsonline.adb.org/regional/data.php 
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Figure 3: Bond yields of Emerging Asian economies and major advanced economies 
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Figure 4: Three months interbank rates and ten years Treasury bond yields (for the US, 
Euro area (EA), Japan shadow rates used instead of interbank rates) 
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Figure 5: Generalized impulse responses to shocks emanating from the US 
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Figure 6: Generalized impulse responses to shocks emanating from the Euro area 
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Figure 7: Generalized impulse responses to shocks emanating from Japan 
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Figure 8: Dynamics of total spillover index and directional spillovers from major 
advanced countries to Emerging Asia
202 – 2017
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Figure 9: Spillovers to individual Asian economies 
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Figure 10: Total directional spillover from the US to Emerging Asia 
 
Note: Dashed lines present the events as described in Table 3. 
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Figure 11: Pairwise directional spillovers from the US to India, Thailand, Malaysia, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, the Philippines, Indonesia and China 
 
 
 
Note: Dashed lines present the events as described in Table 3. 
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Figure 12: Total directional spillover from Japan to Emerging Asia 
 
Note: Dashed lines present the events as described in Table 4. 
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Figure 13: Pairwise directional spillovers from Japan to India, Thailand, Malaysia, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, the Philippines, Indonesia and China 
 
 
 
Note: Dashed lines present the events as described in Table 4. 
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Figure 14: Total directional spillover from the Euro area to Emerging Asia 
 
Note: Dashed lines present the events as described in Table 5. 
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Figure 15: Pairwise directional spillovers from the Euro area to India, Thailand, 
Malaysia, Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, the Philippines, Indonesia and China 
 
 
 
Note: Dashed lines present the events as described in Table 5. 
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Figure 16: Total directional spillover from China to Emerging Asia 
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Figure 17: Nominal effective exchange rates 
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Figure 18: Results for different model specifications16 
  
  
 
                                                           
16
 Index “a” refers to the baseline model, index “b” refers to the model with endogenous VIX and oil prices, 
index “c” refers to the model with nominal effective exchange rates included, and index “d” refers to the model 
with the first principal component of nominal effective exchange rates included. 
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Figure 19: Sensitivity of the results to different lag order choices 
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Figure 20: Sensitivity of the results to different forecast horizons’ choices 
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APPENDIX 
Figure A1: Dynamics of total spillover index and directional spillovers from major 
advanced countries to Emerging Asia: specification with included trend
 
                                                          
17
 The results for estimations which include a time trend are available upon request.
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